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Commonwealth Oral History Project interview with Professor Yash Ghai, part 1 
 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow interviewing Professor Yash Ghai at Senate House on 
Tuesday, 14th July 2015.  Professor Ghai, thank you very much indeed 
for coming to Senate House to contribute to this oral history of the 
Commonwealth project. Please could you begin by saying how you 
became involved in the Commonwealth and its activities. 
 
YG: I became involved through my work on constitutions.  When I started my 
career as a law teacher, I was particularly interested in constitution law. This 
was a time when countries in East Africa were becoming independent and, 
indeed, when Kenya’s conferences at Lancaster House took place. I was 
finishing doctoral work in Oxford. When they came to London, I would come 
and stand outside Lancaster House to watch them go inside. 
 
SO: This was in 1961/1962? 
 
YG: Yeah, ‘61/ ‘62.  I would start talking to them asking about their progress. My 
thesis was on protection of minorities and so that was all very close to my 
interests. Then when I went to teach at the new law school in Dar es Salaam, 
Kenya had not actually become independent, though it did soon thereafter, as 
Uganda and Tanganyika had become. There was much constitutional 
engineering going on: Nyerere was moving towards a one party state.  
Uganda was struggling to define its relationship with the Buganda. And then 
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in 1963, December, Kenya became independent. So it was a good time to be 
studying constitutions.  
 
That was my academic experience, but then I got asked to (I not quite sure of 
the dates) help with the drafting of the independence constitutions of Papua 
New Guinea and Seychelles Islands. At that stage, my bigger engagement 
was with the constitution of Papua New Guinea. My engagement in 
Seychelles was somewhat limited because I was advising the opposition.  
They said, “Can you come to Seychelles?” I was in Nairobi (and) Dar es 
Salaam so it was easy. But they didn’t have the money and said, “We are 
holding a fete on Sunday and if we raise enough money, we’ll send you a 
[laughter] ticket.” But they were not able to raise the money [laughter].  
 
I met them when they came to London (where I was on another matter) and 
my role as they described it was largely to look at the electoral system, which 
wasn’t really my main expertise--they were concerned that the other side was 
engineering, fixing things. They were meeting in Lancaster House and we 
were staying in a hotel nearby. At the end of each day, we would get together 
and review the day’s proceedings and then anticipate the following day’s 
business. 
 
But my own work came to an unexpected end because one evening our 
leader, who was Leader of the Opposition then, Albert René didn’t come 
when we met to assess the day’s proceedings. We all used to go back, have 
a quick wash and come down, have a drink and meal and talk over it.  We 
waited and waited. He didn’t come till quite late, so we were getting a bit 
worried. Well, meanwhile he and the Chief Minister had taken off to a pub on 
their own and they had made several agreements, including on power 
sharing. The Chief Minister told him, “You can be number two in the cabinet, 
etc. And don’t worry about the electoral thing. We’ll sort it out.” So I had 
nothing more to do. I did have a note for them, which I probably have lost 
forever, on a fair electoral system and they did make some changes, but he 
lost interest. I saw them now and then, and within two days, the whole thing 
was wrapped up because that was the big stumbling block. 
 
3 
 
SO: Because of the private, backroom deal in a pub? 
 
YG: Yes, exactly. 
 
SO: But, Sir, the proposals that you’d made for the electoral system, had 
you been arguing for proportional representation? 
 
YG: Yes. 
 
SO: Had you been arguing for the block votes protection for minorities? 
 
YG: Well, I can’t really remember to be very honest, but I think I proposed 
proportional representation as I think that is fairer than first past the post. We 
also recommended an independent electoral commission. At that time they 
didn’t have that. They were a bit afraid that when they drew  the boundaries, 
there would be more room for manipulation in first-past-the-post system. A 
proportional representation system would reflect better the popular support for 
parties. The other thing I was working on for a while was the question of the 
islands on which Britain had built military installations. Their view was that the 
islands belonged to them. They wanted to see if there was some way to 
recover these.  Later, I realised that Mauritius had an interest in this). So I 
went to the Foreign Office; they had made a treaty with the US. In fact, most 
of the troops were the US. They made an agreement with the US for 
establishing a military base there. But the Foreign Office won’t give it to me. 
They said, “No, these are confidential documents.” I said, “Come on, this is a 
Government. These are people who are now negotiating independence. They 
claim their island belongs to them.” But they wouldn’t show it to me.  An hour 
later, I was at the American Embassy invoking the Freedom of Information 
Act of the US Congress. I said, “I’m entitled to it.”  “Of course you are, Sir” 
and they produced the treaty with Britain. But the conference ended without 
that being resolved and they said, “Well, we’ll leave it at that” and the 
Seychelles people accepted that.  
 
SO: At independence then, Britain maintained its military bases and its naval 
installations on the island in perpetuity? 
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YG: Yes, in perpetuity basically. We wanted to establish the entitlement of 
Seychelles Islands to that part of it as was hived off by Britain because they 
wanted to have a military base there.  
 
SO: So did you look to other Commonwealth countries which had been in 
the same predicament at independence, such as Cyprus for instance? 
 
YG: No, I haven’t looked at that. Mauritius also had some feeling that there were 
some islands, but I was not involved in Mauritius, so I don’t know. I am not 
aware of any, but they must have problems in the South Pacific where there 
are so many what are called ‘island states’ now. 
 
SO: Sir, did you have any contact with the Commonwealth Secretariat during 
this time? 
 
YG: At that time, no. I did visit them. I think both delegations made a courtesy call 
more than anything else, but then the next thing was Papua New Guinea. 
Maybe it was before Seychelles, I have to look at the dates… 
 
SO: Seychelles joined the Commonwealth, having become independent in 
June 1976. Papua New Guinea in September ’75.  
 
YG: Yes, that’s right. In fact, one reason I was drawn in later in the Seychelles 
was because they’d heard of my work in Papua New Guinea. 
 
SO: How did you become involved in the constitutional arrangements for 
devolution in Papua New Guinea? 
 
YG: I was quite surprised. I was in exile from my country. I won’t go into that 
unless you want to. I was teaching at the Yale Law School and got a telegram 
one day from Papua New Guinea [asking] whether I would go there to write 
the constitution for independence. I was quite surprised. I didn’t know very 
much about Papua New Guinea. It turns out that the Australians offered them 
some consultants from Australia, and the local leaders felt that they may be 
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biased and they may be influenced by, or even directed by, the Australian 
Government. So they wanted input from a totally independent person. They 
just had established a law school and the first dean of the law school was, at 
one stage, my dean in Dar es Salaam. So they asked him and he 
recommended me because, at that time, I was doing some work for Nyerere 
on Tanzania’s constitution. I can come to that later if you want to. 
 
SO: Yes, please. 
 
YG: Then there was also an Australian lawyer in the Attorney General’s office who 
had done his PhD in this university. They asked him and he recommended 
me too and when I asked him years later, “Why?  You don’t even know me. 
We never met.” He said, “Your book Public Law and Political Change in 
Kenya was the standard book at that time in this course we were doing, so I 
got to know of your work, etc.” So they asked me if I would come.  I was 
teaching and so it was hard for me to be away for long periods. What we 
agreed was that I would go periodically…and this was before the internet…  
 
SO: I was going to say, travelling from Yale to Port Moresby! 
 
YG: Yes. I said, that I would stay for as long as I could and could make return 
visits. In between I would keep in touch through faxes. I had loads of faxes 
that went both ways. At that time, the funding came from, I think, the 
Australian Government, or from the Papua New Guinea Government, but they 
were paid by the Australians for this project. On my subsequent visits, I think I 
was approached by the Commonwealth Secretariat to say that they were 
willing to support my expenses and fees, and so on. I discussed that with the 
Chief Minister, Michael Somare, and it was agreed that the ComSec would 
pick up my expenses. All together I must have made six visits, some short, 
some long.   
 
SO: How contentious was the proposal for a devolved system? 
 
YG: Well, that was quite contentious because, as in most colonies, the country 
was ruled under very centralised administration. Papua New Guinea had an 
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enormous diversity. They had 400 language groups, but some languages 
have died out since then. There were a lot of islands as well, so there were a 
lot of different identities. They didn’t use that term so much as the term is 
used now. So the issue of power sharing was raised by some of the 
communities, which were mostly island communities. The most active was 
Bouganville; one of the major leaders (John Momis) was also the Member of 
Parliament and Deputy Chair of the Commission I worked with; and since 
Michael Somare, who was a titular Chair, was busy with routine Government 
business, Momis essentially became the Chair. Kaputin was the other leader 
who came from the northern islands. They were very anxious that there 
should be some form of decentralisation so that it would give them some 
autonomy. Some areas were not so keen because they didn’t have educated 
people, so they were nervous about the responsibility that would come in 
devolution. 
 
So I was asked to develop some ideas on devolution, which I did, taking 
account both of the groups that wanted it, and then those who didn’t, by 
prescribing a number of powers for the units but giving those units who did 
not want some powers, they could opt out of them—or indeed rely completely 
on national administration. It made it difficult for the central government to 
manage provinces (as these units were called). I advised that it would be 
unwise to impose devolution on groups not ready or willing to assume 
responsibilities, and at that stage devolution should be established in areas 
where there was a demand for it—especially as they were likely to attempt 
secession. It would make little sense to start on independence by invading 
certain areas. Nor did they have the armed forces which could prevent 
secession. And Australians probably would not be keen to become involved in 
their domestic quarrels. My proposal, I thought, was fair to all groups.  
 
Well, that was more or less accepted. I actually got a very good scholar from 
Canada, Ron Watts.  He was, in my view, the greatest authority on 
federalism. He was then professor at Queens University in Canada and he 
subsequently became the Vice Chancellor or the President of that university. 
He still is active. He is now 84 and he and I had been working for the last year 
or so, in Solomon Islands. That’s another story I’ll tell you.  We are supposed 
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to meet there in September, but I got a letter from him the other day saying, 
that he was not well and the doctors had advised him against travel. [Ron 
Watts died in October 2015]  
 
SO: Well, he is the most extraordinary repository of knowledge. 
 
YG: Yes. He is just fantastic, and a really nice man. So anyway, I asked if he 
would come. Now, I don’t know whether ComSec paid for him, or we found 
money within our own budget. I wasn’t anyway dealing with administrative 
matters. When we had done it, we had agreed on it, the Constituent 
Assembly had endorsed this and before the draft was formally adopted, there 
was a delegation of HABITAT, I think. Or UNEP, one or the other. 
 
SO: My apologies, but please could you explain the first acronym, 
HABITAT? 
 
YG: HABITAT. The UN body on housing.  Among the three members of the 
delegation was a Kenyan, Philip Ndegwa, an economist, then working for the 
UN. Subsequently, he returned to Kenya and become a very key figure in the 
new public administration. He said to Sir Michael Somare, “Oh, you’re stupid 
to have devolution. We in Kenya, in the 1963 constitution, were forced by 
Britain to have federalism and we abolished it within months of 
independence.” This was true: Jomo Kenyatta said many times later that he 
did not want devolution but Britain insisted on it as the price of independence. 
He agreed to it for this reason, but intended to abolish it after the British went 
away. There’s a very good account of this bit of history by an American 
historian, Robert Maxon, who has published a study of the negotiations on the 
basis of the British archives which were opened up a few years ago. [Kenya's 
Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and End of Empire] It is a 
very detailed account of negotiations and it comes through in that book. We 
all know that Kenyatta accepted this, fully intending to demolish it, which he 
did on the first anniversary of independence. 
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SO: So there was no moratorium on changing the constitution, as was the 
later case with Zimbabwe? There was no embedded clause proscribing 
constitutional change for a certain period?  
 
YG: On the contrary, the entrenchment of devolution, and several other 
provisions, was very strong—requiring 90% votes in both Houses. The fact is 
that the most ardent supporters of devolution were the smaller indigenous 
communities who did not trust the larger communities, including Kenyatta’s 
Kikuyu. He gave every MP, and senators, large sums of money to buy their 
votes. 41 Senators voted to get themselves out of business, in return for a 
substantial sum of money, but were granted membership of the National 
Assembly, without any elections. 
 
SO: So it became a unicameral arrangement. 
 
YG: Unicameral. +Of course, after that all the functions of the Senate were 
abolished. But the point of my story is that Somare accepted Philip Ndegwa’s 
advice.  He didn’t consult any of us. I was not physically in the country then.  
People were outraged. Not everyone, but in Bouganville particularly.  
Eventually it led to secession by them.  
 
SO: Sir, had the draft constitution been published before it went to the 
Constituent Assembly? 
 
YG: Oh yes. It was published. It was debated in the Constituent Assembly. 
 
SO: Was that standard practice? That a draft would be published and go to a 
Constituent Assembly? 
 
YG: Well, there are different ways but that’s probably the most common one. It 
was published and made available to everyone. We went round the island.  
We talked to people. We wanted to know what they were thinking. Somare 
consulted few members of the Constitutional Commission and to everyone’s 
surprise, introduced the motion to delete devolution. I talked subsequently to 
the Ministers and Father Momis, who was the de facto Chairman of the 
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Commission - they were all surprised because [the] next day, when at the 
very end of the process, Somare introduced a motion to repeal the entire 
chapter and had enough votes. Then Bouganville said, “Okay, if that’s what 
you want, we’re leaving”  just before independence. They declared secession 
on Independence day, led by  Momis, who was the father on the constitution, 
we all acknowledge him as that. Some people were killed in Bougainville, by 
the police, sent from Port Moresby. It became very nasty. Then I was asked if 
I would return and help to find some settlement, because somebody like me 
was seen as neutral. I had become very close to Momis and have continued 
to be very close to him. So I mediated and persuaded the National 
Government to accept to restore that chapter. 
 
SO: Sir, this really was conflict resolution? 
 
YG: It was conflict resolution. Yes, absolutely.   
 
SO: How did you go about that, Sir, because…excuse me, but you’re a 
Professor of Law…? 
 
YG: Well, that’s a good question [laughter]. It was the question of trying to stop 
secession because they were afraid these other island groups would follow 
Bougainville’s example. I mentioned earlier a politician by the name of  
Kaputin, who was the other major champion of autonomy and wanted it for his 
own area. He and Momis were also national figures, both Members of the 
Parliament. Kaputin was a Minister and John Momis could have been but he 
chose not to at that stage, so they were quite important people.  Then I got 
the Australians to put gentle pressure on both sides.  Eventually they agreed 
to set up a negotiating process with delegates from the two sides, with 
lawyers. I was first asked to be a mediator, but as the negotiations started, 
Bougainville had no lawyer to speak of and the Government had quite senior 
lawyers. Momis asked me if I would agree to be their advisor. I said, “Well, it’s 
a bit difficult.  We have started the process but we haven’t gone very far and I 
can see that you do need backing of your legal services, but this is a matter 
for Somare and you to work out.”  So they met and they asked me to come 
with them. I said, “I have no objection if you are agreed and I don’t have any 
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secrets that I’ve taken from the Government, which would then disqualify me.”  
I said, “I don’t see any conflict of interest.”  So that was agreed. I essentially 
became negotiator for Bouganville. The Government, of course, had 
economists and civil servants, and there was hardly anything on the other 
side. 
 
SO: I was going to ask, “What was your administrative backup?” 
 
YG: Oh, very little. But fortunately, all the people we were negotiating with were 
sort of friends because the time I had spent there working, I was seeing 
senior civil servants, economists because I needed to know more about the 
country. We were doing the finance chapter. I needed to know quite a lot 
about finance. We were dealing with land issues. I had to talk to the Ministry 
of Lands. So by the time the negotiations started, I knew most of them quite 
well and became good friends with them. 
 
SO: The country would have had a relatively small pool of civil servants. 
 
YG: Yeah. So it was, on the whole. We did resolve differences and six months or 
so later the first constitutional amendment was approved in the form of a long 
chapter.  
 
SO: So devolution was reinstated. 
 
YG: Yeah. Momis continued to be in Parliament and continued to work in Port 
Moresby, though Bougainville began to set up local assemblies and 
government.  
 
SO: Sir, were the Australians providing a degree of diplomatic support and 
logistical support throughout the negotiations? 
 
YG: Yes, they were and they were putting gentle pressure on both sides to 
compromise. So that was my role. Then I was asked to - by this time, I had 
left Yale, and was in Uppsala, Sweden - they asked me if I would take six 
months off and come and help to implement the constitution, including, 
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particularly, devolution. I suggested that they set up a ministry of devolution 
and, under that, a special sub-unit with responsibility for implementation. I 
worked de facto as the Chair but I didn’t want that. I wanted a local person to 
be chair. I worked the next six months setting up the whole system and I’m 
glad I did, because there was stiff hostility to it from some mainlanders.There 
was also lack of technical knowledge. Most people had very little relevant  
education. I asked Somare, even in the very beginning that I would like to 
work with one or two young lawyers so that they would acquire knowledge 
and experience of the constitution and the background to its various 
provisions, minimizing reliance on foreign lawyers. Somare nominated 
Bernard Narakobi, who died recently. He became very distinguished: he 
became Chief Justice, then became Attorney General, then was High 
Commissioner to New Zealand. When I was working in Vanuatu, as it was 
then the Condominium of the New Hebrides, I suggested they should get this 
gentleman to help them because he’d gone through the whole process with 
me, and they did invite him.  He did a good job. I wanted a Pacific Islander, so 
the leaders of the New Hebrides would feel empowered, and appreciate that 
a Papua New Guinean had helped them with the constitution.  So I was very 
pleased when he came, and we overlapped. I would go back to do my 
teaching and he would stay on for a while. 
 
The last time I met him was about eight or nine years ago, maybe less. I was 
invited by a university in Auckland to give some very distinguished annual 
lectures. Then the Governor General invited me to spend two days with him in 
Wellington. I knew before I went that Bernard was the High Commissioner 
and we would meet.    
 
SO: This is fascinating: there you are, as a Kenyan professor of law working 
as an autonomous diplomat, drawing upon this global network of 
academics and knowledge. It seems this was not simply within the 
Commonwealth.  It goes beyond that.  And you were acting as a very 
important resource for developing countries moving to independence. 
 
 Another specific dimension to your work was the operation of the 
Kiribati Constitution provisions for the Banabans. 
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YG: Yes. Well, that wasn’t my most important. My most important work was in Fiji 
and Solomon Islands. Solomon Islands was quite a big and demanding 
assignment. I was asked to advise the local political groups in their 
negotiations on independence with Britain. I was the main advisor—indeed I 
was the only advisor. At first the leader of the opposition refused to accept me 
as a general adviser, saying I could not advise both him and the Chief 
Minister.  But after a while he accepted my credentials as an independent 
adviser, committed to the cause of independence and able to stand up to the 
pressure from Britain. Indeed at the final session of the Legislative Assembly 
on the adoption of the constitution, he paid high compliments to me for my 
work, saying that I united the country which was torn bitterly before my arrival.  
I was sitting in the public gallery when he said this; I was deeply moved.  
 
At that time, I had nothing to do with the ComSec except, of course, they 
wondered if I could do a periodic briefing for them. At that time, Solomon 
Islands was, of course, British and it was the British who approached me and 
asked me if I would [assist]. What happened was that Britain, at that time, 
wanted to get out of the South Pacific. They seem to have had enough 
colonialism. In the Solomon Islands – like most countries that I worked in – 
there were deep divisions on whether they wanted to be independent or not. 
Britain wanted to push them towards independence. So they asked local 
people who they would like as adviser and they consulted the Papua New 
Guinea prime minister who recommended me, saying I had done a good job 
there!  
 
SO: It’s interesting that Britain should be pushing them so, rather than 
allowing these small islands autonomy with free association, say – as 
the Cook Islands and Niue have with New Zealand. 
 
YG: I think there was a feeling that there was little purpose now in continuing to 
possess colonies in the South Pacific, as Australia would take care of 
strategic matters and issues of interest to Britain. At this juncture I dealt a lot 
with the British Foreign Office and at the same time I was advisor to the local 
groups. The ODM [British aid agency], whatever it was called then, was 
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paying my fees and expenses. By that time, I had started teaching at the 
University of Warwick. Solomon Islanders were deeply divided on 
independence issues. So I worked hard with them to build some consensus 
between their leaders, as later I did in New Hebrides (now Vanuatu). They 
trusted me, not associating me with Britain, but ‘a Third World person’. In 
most places I worked in the South Pacific, a very important role has really 
been as a mediator. This relates to your question earlier: “you’re a lawyer, but 
helping in mediation.” As a constitutional lawyer, I was familiar with various 
forms of structures of the state and was able to make proposals to narrow 
their differences. There was a lot of bitterness between the Leader of the 
Opposition and Chief Minister. So I realised that I really had to get them 
together before the negotiations with Britain. I said, “You should negotiate as 
a united people. If you are fighting yourselves, Britain will play one against the 
other so you have to do that.” And I worked on it, and worked on it. I would 
wear slippers and  go to the Leader of the Opposition. I said, “I’m coming 
home to you. Do you have a free moment?” They liked that. For them, I was 
not a pompous civil servant coming from London. So I was able to establish a 
rapport. I was able to travel through the country, but not as extensively as in 
PNG. I accompanied their delegation to London twice, for negotiations with 
the British government. The Solomon Island constitution was very much my 
work—especially also because I got on well with the people in the British 
Foreign Office. Who some time later gave me a CBE! 
 
SO: Sir, did you go in with a constitutional template of what would be 
appropriate? Or were you really responding with what you thought 
would be appropriate in each separate instance, given the local 
environment? 
 
YG: I was partly responding to the local environment. A committee had been set 
up just before I went there, for consultation with the people, going round the 
country and talking to the people. I had access to the summary of their 
meetings and tentative conclusions/recommendations. I began my work by 
looking at that and commenting on the draft as well as refining it.  They set up 
a Parliamentary Committee consisting of both sides; and I spent a fortnight or 
so with them, just going through what a constitution consisted of. Very basic 
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things, though some of them, senior civil servants or officials, were quite 
knowledgeable- not just people from the village. 
  
Then we looked at other examples. Of course, the Foreign Office had a lot of 
experience of independence colonies’ constitutions. I myself had been 
studying independent constitutions of East Africa.  But I would do it very 
differently today, but if you look at the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, that will 
give you an idea of my kind of a constitution today. But that was a more 
standard constitution. On the other hand, the Solomon Islands consisted of, at 
that time, 300,000 people spread over 11 islands, or 11 archipelagos you 
might almost say. There are these constraints of resources, and one has to 
adjust to that.   
 
SO: Were you supported by the Legal Affairs Division at the Secretariat at 
all? 
 
YG: Not really. By that time, I’d got to know them, the Director from New Zealand, 
Jeremy Pope and the former Attorney General of Western Samoa, Tuiloma 
Neroni Slade. Slade later became Samoa’s Ambassador to UN. He and I 
became quite good friends. He would come and stay with us weekends in 
Warwick. He and I were both involved in Kiribati.  
 
SO: Was this over the question of rights for the Banabans? 
 
YG: Yeah, it definitely was. The Banabans were a group living on Rabi Island 
where they have been relocated. 
 
SO: In Fiji. 
 
YG: I went to Banaba/Ocean Island, their traditional abode.  It was now like a 
lunar landscape. The British Mining Commission had take off the phosphate 
but they had restored nothing back as they were legally required to. Their 
agriculture was destroyed. It was impossible to go on living there. One 
solution - this was right before (Kiribati) independence - was to buy an island 
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in the Fiji Islands and give them the option of moving there. We also visited 
them there.   
 
SO: But, Sir, on the question of the Banabans: the British had relocated 
most of the population in 1945. As you say, the British phosphate 
company had essentially stripped the island, and it was a question of 
right of return and compensation? 
 
YG: Yes. Well, they could, of course, stay there. There was some compensation 
which they used, oddly, to buy big property in Melbourne. It went to the 
Kiribati Government rather than to Banabans, but I think they got a share of it 
also. Then most of them took the option of going to Rabi in Fiji. Some stayed 
on. I think what they wanted was to maintain their links with their traditional 
homeland, because of their strong sense of belonging to the land, as you 
know is the case with most pre-industrial societies. So somebody in the family 
stays there and then after six months, somebody else would come from Fiji 
and this chap would then return to Rabi. 
  
 The constitution of Kiribati, with which I had nothing to do, had provided in a 
separate chapter for the rights of these people. It had granted them equal 
rights and special programmes and so on. It was also agreed that, so many 
years after independence - maybe it was 5 or 10 - that there would be an 
independent review of those constitutional provisions to see how far the 
Government has kept its promise. Is there some new kind of assistance 
Britain and the Kiribati Government should provide for them? So I was asked 
by the ComSec if I would join a three person panel to investigate the situation 
of the Banabans. By then I had already done various consultancies for the 
Comsec. The original work I did with ComSec was when Ramphal was the 
Secretary General. Then it was the Nigerian Chief Emeka Anyaoku. The 
former Chief Justice of Nigeria was to chair the Panel. Neroni Slade was 
made Counsel assisting the Panel. We had rather judicial type of 
proceedings, to ensure people came and were able to make their 
presentations, when Slade would brief them and pose questions. So it 
became a very formal enquiry. Then we wrote our report. I basically wrote it 
and worked closely with Neroni. Our conclusion was that though promises 
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had been kept by the Kiribati Government and British Government, there was 
clearly more to be done. Some parts of the island were also not that well off. 
We did make four or five recommendations which, I think, were accepted, 
largely. So that was really all I did there. 
 
SO: Sir, your longest involvement then seems to have been with things 
Fijian in the Pacific, dating back to 1987. 
 
YG: It was after the first coup, yes. Before that, I had worked in Vanuatu and that 
was also a very critical role. The French and the British were there.  
 
 But let’s go to Fiji. I hadn’t really had many contacts in Fiji. Whenever I was 
going to Pacific Island states, I was almost always routed to Fiji on the 
international flights and then pick up a local flight. Then I would sometimes 
stay for one or two days, when I established some contact with the university. 
 
SO: The University of the South Pacific? 
 
YG: Yes. There’s a New Zealander who died recently, Ron Crocombe. He ran the 
Institute of Pacific Studies. I had a six months’ visiting professorship when I 
got to know more about Fiji. My contacts at that time were almost entirely 
indigenous Fijians. Then when the coup took place in 1987, I became very 
interested in Fiji’s constitution. My project for the University of [the] South 
Pacific was a training programme for senior lawyers and public servants in 
senior legal and political positions. Apart from my own research, I ran a 
training programme because a number of new constitutions were being 
established and others were on the way. It involved training new Attorneys 
General, senior lawyers, public servants. It was a South Pacific project 
including Micronesia and so on. I edited a book about the constitutions of the 
region, in which about half the chapters were written by me. When the coup 
took place, I was back at Warwick and I got a phone call from a former 
employee of the ComSec who set up the Commonwealth of Learning in 
Canada. He was from the Caribbean, of Indian origin. He worked for the 
ComSec for a while and they set up this institute of open learning. Then he 
went to Fiji as the Vice Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, so I 
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had met him a little bit at that time when I had this spell at the university. Then 
one day, after the coup, he rang me and said that Prime Minister Mara would 
like me to go to Fiji and help with constitutional issues. Before I could say 
anything, he said, “Don’t worry. We’re going to pay you very well. We are 
going to send you a first class ticket. I have already negotiated a lot of money 
for you from ComSec” and so on. I said, “Well, my question is what’s 
happening and what is my role?” Because I was afraid they wanted me there 
to and “fix it,” There had been some cases where the courts in other countries 
had accepted the coup as lawful. Mara’s expectation was that I would help 
the new regime to achieve a similar status. I had no intention to help them “fix 
it”—and expressed my willingness to go to help with the return to 
constitutionality. I suspected that Mara was in part responsible or the coup—it 
was not his doing, but I thought he was behind it. That person was Sitiveni 
Rabuka. So I said no. Then we had two or three more conversations and 
exchanges. I said, “No, I’m sorry, I don’t feel comfortable with this idea.” 
About a week or so later, Bavadra and his Attorney General, an Indo-Fijian 
politician... 
 
SO: Jai Ram Reddy? 
 
YG: Jai Ram Reddy. Exactly. I read in the newspaper sitting in Warwick that this 
group was in London to meet the Queen, who was after all the Head of State 
of Fiji. The British Government wasn’t so keen for them to come to London 
and even less keen that he should see the Queen. So they never saw the 
Queen, but met her Private Secretary. 
 
SO: Michael Shea? 
 
YG: Yeah, maybe. I wasn’t in that meeting. What I did was to call the Foreign 
Office, because I had friends there by then, having worked with them on 
some situations. I asked them if they knew where the Fiji delegation was 
staying. They gave me the name of the hotel, so I rang the hotel and told the 
receptionist I want to speak with Mr Bavadra (whom I had not met until then).  
He came on the phone and I introduced myself. He said, “Well, we know your 
name and we know that the Government tried to get you.” I said, “Well, I have 
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said, “No” but can I do something for you while you’re in Britain?” And they 
said, “Well, we are waiting to see the Queen. Two days we have been 
waiting.”  I said, “I’ll be happy to come to London to meet you, just to chat with 
you if you want me to.” So he said, “Wait a minute. I’ll give the 'phone to my 
Attorney General.” Then Jai Ram came on the phone. It was the first time I 
had contact with him. He said, “Well, it would help us if you came. We don’t 
know what you can do. But we are very confused now.” 
 
SO: Yes, I think they couldn’t even get into see the Commonwealth 
Secretary General. 
 
YG: Yeah, that’s right. I went there, I think it was the same day or next day. 
Chaudry was there, Reddy was there, as were Bavadra, and two or three 
senior Fijian Ministers. They said, “We have been waiting and we haven’t 
seen the Queen. We have seen the Private Secretary. He said the Queen is 
very busy. We haven’t had much contact with the Foreign Office.” I was 
outraged when I heard that. I said, “Well, let me know…I can’t do much really. 
I have friends in the Foreign Office, but this kind of decision is taken at very 
high levels and they can’t do much either.” So then they went back to Fiji and 
I said, “Well, try to talk to Mara and see if you can have some dialogue with 
him.” 
 
They returned home and I think they did see Mara. Mara also was finding the 
situation uncomfortable. They rang me and told me that they did have some 
discussions with Mara and there was a possibility of negotiations between 
their party and that of Mara. They wanted me to go to Fiji to advise them—
within a week. I said, “This puts me in a difficult position because if Mara or 
his Permanent Secretary, that ComSec man, sees me in that room they’ll be 
furious. I say no to them--then I come as your advisor.” They said, “Well, what 
shall we do?” I said, “I can give you advice but I’m not sure taking me to the 
negotiating room is the best idea.” And they said, “Well, we really want to talk 
to you. Please come.” So I said, “I’m happy to come, of course.” 
 
I flew to Fiji; there were soldiers everywhere. Bavadra had said he would send 
some people to meet and drive me to the West where Bavadra and several of 
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his colleagues lived; it was, as it were, their part of Fiji. I could not work out 
who were there to meet me—and to be frank, I was quite nervous; and 
instead continued the flight to Suva, the capital city where the government 
had firm control. I knew where Bavadra lived, took a taxi there. His wife was 
there. She said, “They’re all waiting for you in the west.” 
 
SO: [Laughter] Where you’d just flown from, having come into Nadi. 
 
YG: Yeah. Because at Nadi I could not see any one to meet me.  
 
SO: I was going to say, it’s not that big an airport [laughter]. 
 
YG: I then, in the end, said, “Well, maybe they’re waiting there.” I had a difficult 
decision to make. I didn’t have phone numbers or a mobile.  
 
SO: [Laughter] Did you then have to fly back to Nadi. 
 
YG: They said, “Just stay there. We are sending strong bodyguards to pick you 
up.”  The soldiers didn’t know who I was. I could be a tourist, but if Rabuka 
had known, or Mara, I may have been in some trouble. So I stayed with his 
wife, who made tea for me—with biscuits. Then after about a few hours, a big 
van rolled up, with young, tall people like a rugby team.   
 
SO: [Laughter] It probably was. Maybe it was the Sigatoka Rugby Team, or 
something like that. [laughter]. 
 
YG: We then drove back to the west. Every few miles there was a road blockade 
and the soldiers saying, “Who are you?” and asking them some questions.  
Anyway, we got there. We had two or three days of meetings in Nadi with the 
ex-Cabinet.  The meeting with the other side was to be at a resort not far from 
Suva.  
 
SO: You’re thinking of Deuba? 
 
20 
 
YG: Yes. There is where the meeting was and the agreement was called Deuba 
Accord. So what we decided in the end was that I would not go into the 
chamber with them, but we had worked our strategy and argument by then. 
Each time they wanted to talk to me, they would ask for a tea break. I had told 
them that it was perfectly proper in negotiation to say, “We now request a 
break. We’ll come back in two hours.” If they felt they needed to talk to me, 
they would do that; then they would come to my room. I couldn’t even leave 
my room lest I was seen - because most people on the Government side 
knew me during my work at the university and the then opposition groups… 
 
SO: Professor Ghai, you were advising the Fiji Labour Party leaders then on 
a political accommodation with Ratu Mara’s Alliance Party? 
 
YG: Yes… The idea was to restore democracy. Number one. Then ideally, 
reinstate Bavadra. Then have a list of issues that they wanted to discuss, but 
which they would as the dominant member of the Government.  
 
SO: So did you address the issue of the Great Council of Chiefs? 
 
YG: Well, I said let’s avoid it. And then I said what might happen is that, Mara 
would suggest to you a government of power sharing. Then you take it, or not 
take it, depending on other terms of the agreement. It has to be a temporary 
arrangement and there may be some advantage in it for you. But insist, I said, 
that Bavadra is the Leader of the Government, and not Mara (and the 
exclusion of Rabuka). Mara thought he would be Prime Minister. Well, that 
was not subject to negotiation. That was agreed. As agreed in the 
negotiations, they would both be called Prime Minister but First Prime 
Minister, Second Prime Minister. Something like that. I have a record 
somewhere, but anyway, that eventually agreed. No role for Rabuka was 
provided. Remember, the President was also presiding at this meeting and 
seemed anxious to reach some settlement. As the High Chief of the 
community to which Rabuka belonged, he was able to dictate to Rabuka (who 
was not invited to the Deuba negotiations). It seemed as if politicians had got 
the better of the military.  
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           The Deuba Agreement provided for the long term settlement of the differences 
between the parties and a review of the constitution (which was tilted in 
favour of the indigenous Fijians. They were anxious to find a mediator. 
Bavadra wanted me to be that but I told him that I was too committed to his 
party and position, but suggested a former Chief Justice of Tanzania, 
Georges, a native of the Caribbean islands.  
 
On the successful conclusion of the negotiations, the President held a 
reception that night. Bavadra and Reddy asked me to accompany them to the 
“celebrations.” But I was still nervous about running into Mara. They thought 
that Mara had returned to Suva and urged me to join them—which I did. It 
was a great party; everyone was in a good mood and a lot of the local brew 
was consumed. As I was flying back to England very early the next morning, 
my hosts had arranged for a car to take me to Nadi. I would sleep there, then 
early in the morning would go to the airport. Later I received a note from Fiji 
that everyone had a good time and the mood was convivial. But alas soon 
after I got back to Warwick, Rabuka had done another coup and assumed 
power.  
 
SO: He had launched the second coup. 
 
YG: Yes. We suspected that Mara might have had a hand in it. The ‘ex-Prime 
Minister’ as I would call him, Bavadra, rang me and said that it seemed as if I 
would have to be a long term adviser to them. On the breach of the Accord, I 
advised him to tell Mara (who clearly had considerable influence on both the   
President and Rabuka) that he had to fulfil his part of the Deuba Accord. 
Unfortunately Bavadra died soon after this. Tensions between the two parties, 
Bavadra’s Labour Party, now led by Choudhry, and Reddy’s National 
Federation Party—relations between Choudhry and Reddy were for a long 
time tense. Although the coalition broke up after a short while, I persuaded 
both Reddy and Choudhry that the two parties should continue to work 
together on constitutional reform as one group. I made it clear that I would 
find it hard to advise one group, as I had worked with both parties. They 
agreed. In practice I spent more time with Reddy and his party, since I was 
closer to Reddy—and we were both lawyers, and the issues to be negotiated 
22 
 
were largely legal. I did make efforts to work with Choudhry (the secretary of 
his party and I got on very well). And I have to say that on questions of 
constitutional reform the parties were largely united. Mara was not too happy 
with my participation, questioning the role of foreigners, and so, continuing 
the Deuba meetings practice, I tended not to attend inter-party meetings.  
 
           The first major task was to agree on the modalities of the negotiations. I 
proposed that since there was so much distrust between the parties and their 
leaders, that an independent commission should be set up, with clear terms 
of its functions and responsibilities. And since there was so little trust between 
the parties, and indeed by then, between communities, I proposed that the 
commission should be chaired by an outsider. Mara resisted this strongly and 
the other party would not proceed without an independent chair from outside, 
with a distinguished... The stalemate lasted for six months.  
 
Reddy took a firm position on this—the chair must come from outside, be 
person of great integrity and without previous engagement in Fiji. Then Mara 
proposed a former, British administrator, who was rejected by Reddy, 
claiming that he had been anti-Indian when he worked in the colony.   
I contacted a number of in New Zealand and Australia to see if there were 
suitable candidates there. And one friend from New Zealand wrote to me and 
said, “Well, our former Governor General will be a wonderful person. Sir Paul 
Reeves had also been head of the Anglican Church, before he became the 
Governor General.  And he’s indigenous, he’s Maori, so they can’t object.” I 
then wrote to some other friends, got some feedback on him and he seemed 
a very suitable person. 
 
After six months of negotiations on this one point, Mara agreed to have Sir 
Paul Reeves (but gave him cold shoulder throughout the Commission’s 
tenure). The Commission included one nominee each of the two parties 
(Mara nominated a previous senior politician in his party, and Reddy an 
academic (historian) at ANU, Brij Lal, originally of Indo-Fijian origin). I thought 
that this was a fair composition, though we worried how [they] would get on 
together—as it happened, they developed a warm relationship and came to a 
consensus. Reeves told me that it was a pity that I was unable to advise the 
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commission due to my role with the other party. I know Brij Lal as an 
academic. So I prepared the submission for what was increasingly becoming 
the Indo-Fijian party (compared with the more racially mixed party under 
Bavadra). It took some time to develop a consensus between Reddy and 
Choudhury. In the end we produced a very lengthy document (Towards 
Racial Harmony and National Unity). I was then asked to present their 
submission, which I thought was a bad idea. Reddy would have been the 
ideal presenter, the most distinguished lawyer in Fiji and a good orator. The 
compromise was he would start by giving a summary of our proposals and 
then I would take over to go through the detail. He spoke for about 20 
minutes, and I took about a couple of hours, followed by questions from the 
Commission. The session lasted until lunch time, watched by a large 
audience.  
 
Later the Chair of the Commission told me that they wished they could adopt 
all our proposals, but that would be resented by Mara and his party. The 
Commission’s report was itself very lengthy. The report and 
recommendations were excellent—but too long which would have meant that 
not many read it. However, there was a useful and accessible summary. 
 
When all the parties began to negotiate on the basis of the Reeves 
Commission, through a committee of parliamentarians drawn from both 
houses of the legislature, they decided to keep their advisers out. The time 
had come for horse trading. Consequently I decided to return to Warwick. 
When the negotiations were concluded, I received a long note from Jai Ram 
Reddy including the draft agreement and request to return to Fiji for 
consultation before the final discussion and decision by the Assembly. I read 
most of the draft on the long journey to Fiji. The draft agreement was without 
doubt a great improvement on earlier constitutions, with a clear orientation 
towards non-racialism and social justice. But there were several features 
which I feared would be unworkable.  
 
SO: With your proposals for the draft constitution, were you addressing key 
issues such as access to land?  
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YG: Well, yes, everything. Access to land, the voting system, structure of 
government, human rights, everything. On land, in the end, we didn’t resolve 
the problems. I said to Jai Ram Reddy, for whom I was working very closely 
and was staying at his house, that we should try to resolve the land question. 
He thought differently, saying, “Land is a very complicated issue and it could 
tie us down for a long time.” By this time, he had established quite a good 
relationship with Rabuka. Rabuka had been full of contrition, saying, “It was a 
mistake on my part. I will seek forgiveness of Indo-Fijians” and so on. Saying 
that he had a good rapport with Rabuka, he thought that they would together 
win a majority and form a government. This was not to be so. Their parties did 
poorly. Chaudhry’s Labour Party got a majority and formed a government with 
the Fijian party which got substantial number of seats. The result was a 
surprise and a great blow to plans that Rabuka and Reddy made to move 
towards a non-racial political system.  
 
The electoral result reflected the vicissitudes of the electoral system, which 
was designed by a US professor, a great authority on ethnicity, from Duke 
University who was on sabbatical in New Zealand. [Added after the interview: 
The new constitution did not last very long. The new coalition did not work at 
all well, leaders on both side were rather opinionated, with few reform 
initiatives. In the next elections, the balance between the two parties in the 
cabinet changed, with Chaudhry in the minority. It proved difficult to agree on 
the terms on which Chaudhry would join the government, as a junior partner. 
The new government was largely drawn from Fijian and European ministers. 
Eventually it was overthrown by the military which took over the government. 
Though its intention was to return government to civilians under a new 
constitution (and I was approached then to help with the drafting of it—but 
was unable to go there), in the end the military regime stayed on for a long 
time. When it did address the question of civilian rule, I was again asked if I 
would chair the process to make the new constitution—this time I accepted it 
and spent six month (in the first half of 2012) in consultations etc. before a 
constitution was drawn up.] 
 
When I went back in 2012, that [the electoral system] was clearly something 
we had to resolve. We put a lot of effort into that. We arranged seminars for 
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ourselves and leaders of organisations, including political parties. We talked 
to academics. I read books. I got to know a little bit of the problems. And 
again, we came to a very definitive solution, we had, I thought, a good 
scheme. I talked a lot with chiefs. I talked a lot with Indian businessmen. In 
fact I talked to all the key interests, including the Ministry of Indigenous 
Affairs. In the end, I thought we had got some sort of consensus. I was very 
much a pro-Fijian on this issue. I thought, “This is their land and the 
Government can’t just take it away, and give it to others. They have to be 
more involved, but there are also questions on the economy. Let’s look at 
creating a framework where everybody can take part. “Come, let’s do more 
negotiations.” In the end, our provision in my draft - they all call it ‘the Ghai 
Draft’ - was a consultative process to follow after the constitution within 
certain fundamental principles that we laid down. Again, postponing…but we 
had not that much time.  About six months altogether for this huge process, 
which included other consultations. 
 
The position taken by the Prime Minister and the Attorney General was that 
all land now belonged to the people. I said, “How can you get away with that?  
It’s impossible.” But this time I was not talking to the Government. 
 
SO: I know, from looking at the news reports, that your relations did break 
down. 
 
YG: Yeah, they broke down completely. But I had great rapport with almost every 
other group. So land has never been resolved, I’m afraid, and it’s going to be 
a continuing problem. I thought we had worked out something good and I took 
it to some experts. They said, “Well, it’s ambitious. It’s contingent on many 
circumstances, but this is the best thing we have seen on the subject.”  
Anyway, the land issue is still unresolved. If you read this blog by Victor Lal, 
called ‘Fijileaks’, there are a lot of stories about land being grabbed and so 
on, but he, of course, is a little biased about Brij Lal.  But he is extremely well 
informed. He does all the written copy. He has a spy in every ministry! I’m 
very impressed by him [laughter]. 
 
SO: Well, he’s got a great track record as an investigative journalist. 
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YG: Yeah. He has been very good. He was, of course, angry when I took this 
post, but I said, “Well, I’ve taken this post because I’ve been given an open…”   
 
SO: Sir, I think we should stop there, but thank you very much.   
 
[End of first transcript] 
 
 
 
 
